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Strengthening Mutual Trust  
and Credibility Should Remain 
Key Priority
Despite welcoming signs from the 
recent EU-Ukraine Summit, the un-
derlying problems still loom large in 
this special relationship. The EU is 
running out of tools to incentivize 
more difficult reforms, and Ukraine 
is running out of arguments why it 
is unable to tackle corruption, oli-
garchs, and consolidate rule of law. 
With growing geopolitical turmoil in 
the region, a further strengthening 
of this partnership should be a pri-
ority. The risk of an increasing anti- 
Western backlash in Ukraine should 
not be underestimated.
The 22nd EU-Ukraine Summit, which 
was held in Brussels on October 6, 
2020, ended on a surprisingly posi-
tive note considering that on the day 
of the event it was still unclear wheth-
er a joint statement, satisfactory to all 
parties, would be issued. In the end, 
the summit achieved positive results 
for Kyiv, and President Volodymyr 
Zelenskyi got most of what he wanted: 
the EU’s promise to revise the Associ-
ation Agreement (AA) in 2021, a bold 
call on Russia to assume responsibility 
for the lack of more progress made in 
settling the Donbas conflict, and soft 
language on the lack of significant re-
sults on the rule of law, anti-corruption, 
and de-oligarchization.  
The summit could have ended on a 
less positive note given that bilateral 
ties are the most strained they have 
been since the landmark AA came into 
force three years ago. Tensions were 
simmering only a few days before the 
summit during the first trip to Kyiv 
by the European Commission’s High 
Representative Josep Borrell, who un-
derlined the importance of their stra-
tegic partnership but also warned that 
Ukraine should not take the EU’s sup-
port for granted. Tough negotiations 
during the summit on whether to pro-
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lasted until the very last minute. This 
was due to the significant reluctance 
of some EU capitals, particularly Paris, 
to give the green light to the gradual 
economic integration of Ukraine into 
the EU’s Single Market. Due to the lack 
of more EU incentives, and the fact 
that some member states are blocking 
the cooperation on the security di-
mension (another divisive issue among 
the EU-27), the EU has run out of 
tools. Except for financial and techni-
cal assistance, Brussels does not have 
a new big offer for Kyiv to motivate it 
to carry out further painful reforms. 
The EU sees the rule of law and anti- 
corruption as key reform areas for 
Ukraine’s overall transformation. 
Some EU capitals, however, believe 
that Ukraine has not registered any 
significant progress in these fields. 
To Ukrainian decision-makers, the EU 
is less and less ready to deepen rela-
tions with Ukraine regardless of how 
the country performs on reform im-
plementation. On the other hand, 
while the EU considers Ukraine a pri-
ority partner in its Eastern neighbor-
hood, for President Zelenskyii bringing 
peace in Donbas has been the top pri-
ority since he took office in May 2019. 
For his administration, the EU has in-
advertently become a secondary focus. 
This growing mismatch of expecta-
tions and assessments of each other 
should be treated if not as a first crack 
in the neighborhood’s current securi-
ty and stability architecture, then defi-
nitely as one that could pre-determine 
the EU’s long-term role and further 
credibility as a major player in the 
Eastern Partnership region. The EU 
should not avoid this problem or dis-
miss it as a low priority but rather seri-
ously engage with these early warning 
signs as it has proved it can do at the 
recent summit. The best way forward 
is to rebuild mutual trust through a 
step-by-step approach towards the 
main objectives.
UKRAINE’S FRUSTRATION  
WITH THE EU
In recent years, Ukraine’s domes-
tic reform agenda has focused almost 
exclusively on the implementation 
of the AA. But the process of imple-
mentation during the last three years 
has revealed what works well and 
what could work better in the AA. 
That is why one of the main points on 
Ukraine’s agenda is an update of the 
AA in a way that would better under-
line the mutual benefits of cooper-
ation. Ukraine wants an agreement 
that reflects the current opportuni-
ties rather than those that were rele-
vant when it was first negotiated. The 
EU’s hesitance to commit to a revi-
sion of the agreement was something 
that created a lot of tension prior to 
the summit.
Ukraine’s latest victory in finally get-
ting the EU to commit to revising the 
AA may, however, only be a small first 
step. While the lack of progress on key 
reforms was glossed over at the sum-
mit’s press conference, this will lat-
er come back to haunt the Zelenskyi 
administration when it insists on 
“its own way” in the revision of the 
AA. That is because the outcome of 
this process will most likely depend 
on Ukraine’s reform track record. 
Ukraine’s credibility card in Europe is 
reform implementation. 
The unwillingness to proceed with 
deeper sectoral integration in the 
areas of the four freedoms, pro-
posed under former President Petro 
Poroshenko, is another factor affect-
ing relations with the EU. These ini-
tiatives are mainly being blocked by 
those individual EU member states 
that perceive Ukraine as a serious 
competitor should it be given the 
same conditions as EU countries. 
The lack of an EU membership pros-
pect is certainly yet another factor 
that is demobilizing the euro-opti-
mists in Ukraine. However, this does 
not mean that Kyiv and Brussels 
should not think about future me-
ga-incentives, similar to the visa-free 
reg ime, that would motivate the 
Ukrainian government to conduct fur-
ther deep structural reforms. Ideally, 
future incentives have to also cover 
the security dimension, which is cur-
rently being deliberately overlooked. 
This is, however, vital for Ukraine giv-
en Russia’s aggression. In this con-
text, another factor causing a certain 
amount of anxiety in relations is the 
attempt by certain EU countries to 
seek a rapprochement with Russia 
despite the ongoing war against 
Ukraine. 
The lack of ambition and clarity about 
the future goals in EU-Ukraine rela-
tions is not only demobilizing pro-EU 
groups in Ukraine but also allowing 
nationalists and euro-skeptics such as 
The Association Agreement is  
a powerful instrument but it is  
insufficient to mobilize the efforts 
that the reform process demands.
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the pro-Russian forces and oligarchs 
to take advantage and attempt to ma-
nipulate public opinion in Ukraine. On 
the day of Zelenskyi’s visit to Brus-
sels, Viktor Medvedchuk – a leading 
pro-Russian opposition leader and 
opponent of a European future for 
Ukraine – paid a visit to Russia’s Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The 
risk of an anti-Western and anti-Euro-
pean backlash in Ukraine in the near 
future should not be underestimated.
RENEWED UKRAINE 
FATIGUE IN EUROPE
An important factor that is undermin-
ing Ukraine’s credibility and image in 
Europe, albeit not new, is “Ukraine fa-
tigue.” This has been prevalent in EU 
member states for a while now and 
only risks becoming more serious. For 
one, there is no agreeable political 
solution to Donbas in sight, something 
that exposes the EU’s weaknesses 
when it comes to its foreign policy 
towards Russia. Despite some limit-
ed progress in the past year with the 
exchange of prisoners and a frag-
ile ceasefire holding since July 2020, 
the conf lict with Russia over the 
occupied region in Donbas is also 
hurting European economies due to 
the sanctions imposed on Russia. The 
divisions within the EU over how to 
handle Moscow’s behavior are hurting 
the unity of EU-27 and reveal a frag-
ile consensus over the maintenance of 
sanctions. Until the Navalny poison-
ing, there were strong signals from 
major EU capitals of a desire to return 
to a normal relationship with Mos-
cow. The “Russia reset” policy is now 
on hold, which plays in Ukraine’s favor, 
but does not mean it is abandoned. 
While how long this freeze on the re-
set lasts depends mostly on Russia 
rather than on Ukraine, the clear de-
mand for a different relationship with 
Russia remains.
Second, during his first year and a half 
in office, President Zelenskyi and his 
team have not entirely been able to 
show a credible commitment to gen-
uine domestic reforms in the eyes of 
their Western partners. More alarm-
ing, there are signs of rollback. There 
is mounting concern in the EU that 
there is no political will to fight vested 
interests. Furthermore, with a stalled 
judicial reform, recent attacks on anti- 
corruption institutions, and a lack 
of progress on key criminal investi-
gations, Zelenskyi and his govern-
ment are losing the EU member states’ 
trust. But building strong institutions 
through genuine reforms is the key to 
Europe’s heart and wallet.
Frequent reshuffles and the loss of in-
stitutional memory that comes with 
changing public servants are weak-
ening Ukraine’s civil service when it 
comes to the process of reform imple-
mentation and maintaining contacts 
with Western governments. As a re-
sult, governments of some EU member 
states find it difficult to build a rap-
port with their counterparts in gov-
ernmental institutions in Ukraine.
HOW TO MOVE FORWARD 
Trust and credibility in international 
diplomacy are key to making partner-
ships resilient in times of crisis. This 
foundation might be at risk in the EU-
Ukraine relations despite the recent 
summit’s good omens. 
The EU needs to provide clarity on 
where it stands vis-à-vis Ukraine. The 
AA is a powerful instrument but it is 
insufficient to mobilize the unprec-
edented efforts that the reform pro-
cess demands. Between association 
and membership new targets need to 
be set to incentivize reforms. One op-
tion could be the prospect of a “Nor-
way model” for Ukraine, which would 
provide high levels of sectoral integra-
tion but no membership. The EU could 
also reenergize the partnership by 
further developing the economic di-
mension of the AA to make it mutually 
advantageous, provided it could agree 
on such positions within the Coun-
cil. Considering the amount of sup-
port channeled towards Ukraine, EU 
institutions and member states could 
also beef up their expertise on the 
country. While the work of the Com-
mission’s Support Group for Ukraine 
is regarded positively in Ukraine, the 
ultimate decision-making remains 
with the member states. And some 
states lack sufficient expertise on 
Ukraine and are also pursuing their 
own agendas, which do not necessarily 
overlap with that of EU institutions.
Ukraine, in turn, should use smarter 
tactics to diminish opposition with-
in the EU from hesitant key member 
states in order to be able to extract 
more benefits for itself. Undoubtedly 
there is a clear need for more incen-
tives for Ukraine to continue its re-
forms and to help it sell dif f icult 
structural transformations to the 
population as well as to financial in-
terest groups that are interested in 
maintaining the status quo. However, 
the political leadership in Ukraine for 
its part could diversify its portfolio of 
demands by proposing smaller steps 
that could be jointly taken with the 
EU or with smaller coalitions of mem-
ber states that are interested to deep-
en their relations with Ukraine such 
as, for example, Germany, Poland, the 
Nordics and Baltic countries plus the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In times 
of crisis, a mutual commitment to 
more feasible objectives and actions 
is more easily achieved and can help 
consolidate trust.
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